Rethinking Bank Regulation重思银行规章制度

　　This volume assembles and presents a new database on bank regulation in over 150 countries (included also on CD). It offers the first comprehensive cross-country assessment of the impact of bank regulation on the operation of banks, and assesses the validity of the Basel Committee's influential approach to bank regulation.
　　作者简介：
　　James R. Barth is the Lowder Eminent Scholar in Finance at Auburn University and a Senior Finance Fellow at the Milken Institute. He has also been Professor of Economics at George Washington University, Associate Director of the economics program at the National Science Foundation, and Shaw Foundation Professor of Banking and Finance at Nanyang Technological University. Professor Barth was an appointee of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush as Chief Economist of the Office of Thrift Supervision and previously as Chief Economist of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Most recently, he served as leader of an international team advising the People's Bank of China on banking reform from Fall 2002 to Spring 2004. He has authored more than 100 articles in professional journals and has written and edited several books. His research focuses on financial institutions and capital markets, both domestic and global, with special emphasis on regulatory issues. 

　　This volume assembles and presents a new database on bank regulation in over 150 countries (included also on CD). It offers the first comprehensive cross-country assessment of the impact of bank regulation on the operation of banks, and assesses the validity of the Basel Committee’s influential approach to bank regulation. The treatment also provides an empirical evaluation of the historic debate about the proper role of government in the economy by studying bank regulation and analyzes the role of politics in determining regulatory approaches to banking. The data also indicate that restrictions on the entry of new banks, government ownership of banks, and restrictions on bank activities hurt banking system performance. The authors find that domestic political factors shape both regulations and their effectiveness.